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Abstract 
 
Sport is a double-edged sword, it has the potential to bring divided nations 
together but it can also cause or exacerbate tensions and conflicts. Sport 
events do not only provide a stage for political rivalries but also increase 
understanding, celebrate commonalities, facilitate cooperation and bridge 
differences. This paper critically compares the use of sport as a foreign policy 
tool in two politically divided societies: Korea and Germany. The comparative 
analysis examines the very different political use of sport in these two 
countries. In divided Korea, cooperation in the world of sport between the 
North and the South is multi-dimensional, happens at various levels and 
appears to be an important diplomatic tool. In the former divided Germany, 
both the East and the West used sport to establish distinctive national 
identities and to fight ideological battles, even if it stressed differences and 
consolidated the existing political division. Furthermore, the recent increase in 
sport exchanges between South and North Korea offers a unique opportunity 
to examine the changing role and efficacy of contemporary sport diplomacy.  
 
The research implicitly subscribes to the pluralist paradigm of International 
Relations as it avoids the limiting state-centrism of other theoretical 
frameworks. Therefore this investigation deals with all cross-border activities 
and recognises the contributions made by non-governmental organisation, for 
example sport organisations. The largely qualitative research was conducted 
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during a six-month fieldwork period in South Korea in 2006 and a two-week 
visit of the North in 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
At the end of the last millennium Sugden and Bairner edited an impressive 
collection of case studies focusing on and entitled “Sport in Divided Societies” 
(1999). The book covers a selection of European countries (Belgium, 
Germany, Northern Ireland, Spain, Switzerland) as well as developed and 
developing societies in various other parts of the world (Canada, Georgia, 
India, South Africa and Yemen). This choice was obviously the result of 
pragmatic as well as conceptual considerations. In their introduction the 
editors pointed out that 
 
“It is a truism that all societies are divided. There are divisions 
between racial and ethnic groupings, between the rich and the poor, 
the young and the old, between men and women, adults and 
children, the healthy and the sick, and so on. All of these, and 
numerous other divisions, impact on the world of sport.” [1] 
 
Although sport certainly has the potential to overcome or at least reduce such 
divisions, many politicians and sport administrators tend to exaggerate sport’s 
power to heal and bridge these divisions. Concurrently, they are often inclined 
to ignore or play down the fact that sport frequently causes, reinforces and 
exacerbates divisions. One of the International Olympic Committee’s reasons 
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for awarding the right to stage the 1988 Summer Games to Seoul was that it 
would support the process of reconciling South and North Korea. This did not 
happen as North Korea boycotted the Games and, in the ultimate unsporting 
act, blew up a South Korean airliner to put people off attending the Games. 
[2] FIFA, the world governing body of soccer, expressed a similar view when it 
granted South Korea and Japan the right to co-host the 2002 World Cup 
Finals. FIFA hoped that the tournament would help overcome 500 years of 
hostility between the two hosts. [3] There were even suggestions that some 
of the matches should be played in North Korea in order to help improve 
relations between the two Korean states. Although this did not happen either, 
the state controlled North Korean media occasionally reported on the 
outstanding performance of the South Korean team during the 2002 World 
Cup finals – a rare display of nationalism overcoming deep political 
differences.  
 
At least two of the case studies in Sugden and Bairner’s book, Germany and 
Yemen, could be grouped together as both societies were, broadly speaking, 
‘reunited’ in 1990 after being divided along strict political lines. However, 
there is at least one other society that – although not (yet) unified – fits this 
description as it also comprises two independent sovereign states with totally 
different and opposing political and economic orders: Korea (Footnote I). Like 
Germany, Korea’s division into the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South and 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North stems from the 
1945 victory of the Allied Forces in World War II. It was Korea’s misfortune to 
be occupied by the armed forces of the two ideologically opposed superpowers 
which eventually led to the foundation of two Korean states in the late 1940s. 
However, in stark contrast to Germany the end of the Cold War has not 
brought reunification to the Korean peninsula. 
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In the aftermath of the first Summer Olympics in China in 2008, it seems to 
be more than appropriate to reflect on the complex politics of sport on the 
divided Korean between 1990 and 2008. This paper intends to make a 
contribution to the wider area of comparative historical studies, in particular 
to debates about the role of sport in politically divided societies. It 
summarizes some of the findings of a research project which explored the role 
sport plays in the diplomatic activities between the North and the South. The 
dramatic increase in sport exchanges between South and North Korea since 
the early 1990s, all underpinned and framed by the reunification theme, offers 
a unique opportunity to examine the changing role, usefulness and political 
efficacy of sport diplomacy as the global sport order takes shape in the 
twenty-first century. 
 
My analysis is based on data provided by the South Korean government, 
several sports governing bodies, the National Korean Olympic Committee, 
Korean academics and policy advisors of the government. The review of 
academic studies, policy papers and archive material, the collection of local, 
national and international media accounts, the attendance at various press 
conferences, the (semi-structured) interviews with government officials, sport 
administrators, journalists, and fans, and the (participant) observation of 
various sport scenes and events was conducted during a six-month fieldwork 
trip to South Korea in the first half of 2006 which was generously funded by 
the Korea Foundation (Footnote II). My research in North Korea took place in 
September 2008 during the official celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the 
North Korean state. The focus was upon the political contents and messages 
of both the Arirang festival as well as the new mass spectacle entitled ‘Prosper 
our Motherland’. A central theme of both shows, that were performed in 
Pyongang’s impressive May-Day Stadium, was the division and reunification of 
the Korean people. 
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Due to Korea’s very complex past and present the following section presents a 
brief account of the nation’s most important historical and political 
developments with particular reference to the complex reunification issue. 
This forms the basis for the following analysis of sport’s contribution to the 
political and diplomatic relationship between the North and the South. As the 
social, cultural and political significance of sport during Germany’s division 
from 1945 to 1990 and after the reunification process is well documented and 
widely studied, [4] the subsequent conclusion will outline the main 
comparative findings, i.e. commonalities and differences, and also briefly 
consider methodological issues. 
 
The Korean reunification debate: Don’t rock the boat! 
 
Korea’s twentieth century history is dominated by Japan’s ruthless annexation 
which lasted from 1910 to the end of World War II. During this period sport 
was used as an instrument to express Korean nationalism and resistance to 
Japan’s occupation. [5] In 1945, the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the 
USA occupied the country and helped to set up governments sympathetic to 
their respective ideologies and political leaders, leading to Korea’s current 
political division and the parallel existence of two Korean states: the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with an estimated population of 23 
million people in the North, established on 9 September 1948, and the 
Republic of Korea with more than twice as many people (48 million) in the 
South, founded on 15 August 1948. Shortly after the two superpowers pulled 
out most of their troops, on 25 June 1950, South Korea was invaded by the 
North starting the Korean War that is widely considered to be a proxy war in 
the wider context of the Cold War due the involvement of the USA and the 
Soviet Union. China also entered the conflict in order to protect its national 
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security as it felt threatened by the increased American military presence in 
South East Asia. Furthermore,  
 
“Mao determined early in the war that if the North Koreans 
faltered, China had an obligation to come to their aid because of 
the sacrifice of so many Koreans in the Chinese revolution and 
he anti-Japanese resistance” [6]  
 
After a truce was signed with the North (1953), a demilitarized zone (DMZ) 
was established along the thirty-eighth parallel.  
 
The economic miracle in South Korea is well documented and has been widely 
investigated. Copying the Japanese model of economic growth largely based 
on the export of popular mass consumer goods, production increased 
significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. [7] Despite a severe recession following 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korea today enjoys a robust and healthy 
economy. [8] During the Cold War, the North frequently exploited the tense 
relationship between its two main benefactors, the Soviet Union and China, 
and also achieved astonishing progress in standards of living. However, since 
the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its Socialist allies most of 
the markets for North Korean products have all but disappeared. Famines 
have repeatedly swept through the country in recent years, caused by a 
combination of unfortunate weather conditions and inadequate agricultural 
management policies. Consequently, the North has slowly slid into poverty 
and is often called the ‘Hermit Kingdom’ for its closed borders and reluctance 
to deal with outsiders. [9] 
 
More than six decades after the end of World War II, the two Korean states 
face each other across the highly fortified DMZ where the Cold War was more 
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frigid than anywhere else in the world and has not (yet) ended. Although the 
Cold War ceased in 1989, the persistence of Cold War structures and 
hostilities makes the Korean peninsula look like an interactive and topical 
museum of that global ideological and geopolitical conflict. Both Korean states 
proclaim eventual unification as a high priority political goal. Consequently, 
the unification of the Korean people and peninsula is an essential feature of 
both Koreas’ political agendas and discourses. [10] Although there are some 
lively debates about how the Korean peninsula can be reunited, there is 
widespread scepticism that this is going to happen in the foreseeable future. 
Generally, the status quo of two co-existing Korean states is beneficial to all 
parties concerned, most of all the two Koreas as well as the two superpowers 
of China and the USA.  
 
There is no doubt that the South Korean government does not want the 
sudden collapse of the North Korean regime due to the enormous costs it 
would have to bear. “The financial burden of unification which South Korea will 
have to absorb has been estimated at ten times greater than that of West 
Germany, related to Germany’s reunification.” [11] Furthermore, South 
Korean political analysts are worried that such a collapse could set several 
destabilizing developments in motion: Millions of North Koreans suddenly 
crossing the border into the South could quickly overwhelm South Korea’s 
refugee support capacities and would have an enormous negative impact on 
the country’s economy. Therefore Seoul’s political priority is stability which 
precludes precipitating an abrupt collapse of the North Korean regime. For 
that reason the South Korean government has in fact frequently helped the 
North Korean state to alleviate the poverty its population has been suffering 
from through the provision of food, building materials, energy and other basic 
goods. 
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Although “South Korea has become North Korea’s second biggest trade 
partner and aid provider”, [12] a lot more needs to be done to mitigate the 
anticipated massive costs of unification, if and when it happens. South Korea 
will find it economically even more difficult than West Germany to absorb their 
‘friends in need’. Not only is the North Korean economy in much worse shape 
than the East-German was before the wall came down in 1989, but more 
importantly for many Koreans the simple numerical relationship of two South 
Koreans paying for one North Korean (in comparison to four West Germans 
per one East German) appears to be a daunting prospect which partly explains 
the widespread caution and growing scepticism among the South Korean 
population. [13] 
 
Furthermore, the status quo of a strong American military presence in South 
Korea (Footnote III) has a number of economic benefits: “The US alliance 
creates a climate of stability favourable for foreign trade and investment and 
for preferential economic treatment by international financial institutions, 
exemplified in the 1997 International Monetary Fund (Footnote IV) bailout.” 
[14] Indirectly, the US military presence also provides a very large economic 
subsidy to South Korea. Without this US military presence, the South Korean 
government would have to triple its military budget if it wanted to keep up the 
levels of defence following a withdrawal of the American armed forces.   
 
Equally worrisome for Seoul (as well as the USA) is China’s potential reaction 
to such a collapse as this superpower could either intervene directly or 
orchestrate a coup and install a pro-China regime that would further 
complicate a peaceful Korean unification. China’s quiet opposition towards 
unification is based on its reluctance to share an extensive border with a 
unified democratic Korea closely allied with the United States. So far, China 
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has provided North Korea regularly with economic aid to support the regime in 
order to avoid political instability in the area.  
 
“One remarkable feature of North Korea’s external environment after 
the collapse of the socialist states in many parts of the world is that 
all of the four surrounding powers -- China, the U.S., Russia and 
Japan -- are against the collapse of the North. Preoccupied with its 
domestic affairs and afraid of the negative impact of North Korea’s 
sudden collapse on itself, each of them is trying to help stabilize 
North Korea in one way or another.” [15] 
 
Over the past fifty years the reunification of the Korean peninsula has also 
been one of the most frequently expressed foreign policy objectives of the 
North Korean government. Its approach to unification is understandably very 
different. “The Korean War (1950-53) was a catastrophic attempt on the part 
of North Korea to unify the peninsula by the use of force.” [16] Since the early 
1990s the survival of North Korea has been threatened by various internal 
and international developments: the rapid deterioration of living standards 
caused by the failure of the centrally planned economy and excessive defence 
expenditure which led to negative growth rates in the early 1990s; the lack of 
political and economic support due to the collapse of the former Soviet Union 
and the Socialist countries in Eastern and Central Europe which deprived 
North-Korea of major (export) markets; and the extremely strained 
relationship with the USA due to North Korea’s attempts to develop nuclear 
weapons. Consequently, the government’s political focus has shifted. 
Economic regeneration, system survival and the security issue are more 
urgent than the development of detailed reunification proposals. Furthermore, 
taking measures to improve its reputation as a politically stable state are 
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essential to attract the desperately needed foreign investments to boost its 
economy.  
 
Due to these large obstacles it is most unlikely that the reunification of the 
Korean peninsula is going to occur in the near future. However, considering 
the two Koreas remain technically still in a state of war, there has been some 
major progress over the last years. The world of sport acts as a kind of 
frontrunner and pace-setter for the development of various forms of political 
cooperation. Sport exchanges and co-operations are also viewed as a fairly 
accurate reflection of the general political climate on the divided peninsula. 
 
“Peace and Prosperity” through sport 
 
During the Cold War period South Korea went through significant social, 
political and cultural changes. The world of sport did not remain unaffected 
and went through a rapid transformation process that was initiated by the 
Park Jung Hee military regime in the early 1960s. Park’s government (1961 
- 1979) is responsible for the foundation of many of the existing sporting 
organisations and developed some influential policies that were intended to 
enhance the country’s international reputation and prestige. Subsequent 
governments, in particular the Fifth Republic of Chun Doo Hwan (1981 – 
1988) and the Sixth Republic of Roh Tae Woo (1988 – 1993), continued this 
project with a strong emphasis on the promotion of sport for the creation of 
a distinctive national identity and international recognition. [17] 
 
With political endorsement, government resources, an 
effective strategy, public support and an enthusiastic 
educational system, in less than 50 years a revolution in sport 
in schools occurred in the interests of national defence, 
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national self-reliance, national visibility, and national prestige. 
[18]  
 
During this period international sport events provided an ideological 
battleground for the two Korean states both claiming to be the true 
representative of the Korean people. Either they refused to participate in 
protest of the other’s presence or, when they competed against each other, 
the rivalry was fierce. At the same time, the media (as well as school books 
) portrayed the North and its Communist regime as a devious and dangerous 
enemy who could not be trusted and was a threat to the national security of 
the South.  These times are over, at least for now, as the ‘Sunshine Policy’ 
of the previous South Korean government aims for peace, reconciliation and 
prosperity on the whole Korean peninsula. This is clearly reflected in the 
increasing number of inter-Korean sport meetings, exchanges, programmes, 
symbolic gestures and future cooperation plans. The following account has 
chosen some representative examples of cross-border activities and 
recognises the contributions made by sport organisations, e.g. national 
governing bodies and local bidding committees, as well as the media 
covering these events. It is the latter that provide for fairly direct mass 
participation in the ‘high’ politics of international relations.  
 
‘Peace and Prosperity’ is the title of the South Korean 2005 White Paper on 
Unification. In this extensive and detailed policy document of more than 170 
pages, however, sport can hardly be said to play an important role. It is only 
mentioned twice: first in Chapter 2 entitled ‘Progress in Inter-Korean 
Dialogue’ focusing on joint activities during the Sydney (2000), Athens 
(2004) and Beijing (2008) Olympics and subsequently in Chapter 3 
summarizing the ‘Expansion of Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation’ 
which celebrates the joint processions of the South and North Korean teams 
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at the Busan Asian Games (2002), the Aomori Winter Games (2003) and the 
Daegu Summer Universiade (2003). [19] However, it is striking that this 
White Paper does not contain any clear and detailed policies in relation to 
sport. One interviewee, a researcher and policy advisor of the URI 
government, had a simple and straight-forward explanation for this: “Sport 
is very complex. The Seoul Olympics and the Soccer World Cup have been 
good for this country’s reputation and economy. So, whenever the North and 
the South do sports together, it is good for the whole nation – whatever kind 
of sports this is, wherever it happens, who wins, it does not matter as it is 
all about unity.” (13/03/2006) 
 
In sharp contrast, in the 2004 collection of 400 photographs on over 200 pages entitled ‘The 
History of the Development of Inter-Korean Relations’, published by the Advisory Council on 
Democratic and Peaceful Unification, sport plays a much more prominent role. A total of 30 
photos (i.e. about 15%) show sport events, athletes or venues. Most prominently, the front cover 
of the book shows North and South Korean football players in the World Cup Stadium in Seoul. 
Almost all the captions contain the word or make reference to ‘unification’ theme.  Although a 
few of the images are over 50 years old and stem from the early stages of Korea’s political 
division, the vast majority of sport photos derive from activities in the twenty-first century. Two 
parallel strands of political activities involving the world of sport of sport can be easily 
identified: First, the mostly symbolic and short-lived but high profile appearances as a unified 
team on the international stage, and, second, the celebration of national unity through the 
frequent staging of ‘unification sport events’ in both the North and the South. 
 
Marching and competing together at international competitions 
 
Since the North Korean boycott of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, the relationship between the two 
states in the world of sport has significantly improved. Both Koreas have on various occasions 
formed a unified team for international sport events, i.e. at least for the official opening and 
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closing ceremonies. On a much smaller number of occasions have they even competed as one 
team. 
 
Three years after the Seoul Olympics, athletes from the North and the South 
competed as one team in the World Table Tennis Championships in Japan 
and eventually won the women’s team event beating the invincible 
powerhouse of this sport, China. Prior to the tournament, the two sides had failed 
to agree on the location of the training camp for this competition, and eventually ended up 
having a 40-day joint training session in Japan. Most remarkable, however, was the 
use of a new symbol which was to become a permanent accessory at several 
international and domestic sport events in the 21st century: the unification 
flag, a white flag with the shape of the Korean peninsula embroidered in a 
deep blue colour. In the same year a joint soccer team participated in the 
FIFA World Youth Championships in Portugal where they made a big 
impression by reaching the quarter-finals after beating Argentina 1-0 in 
group qualification. 
 
 
  Fig.1 The Korean Unification Flag 
 
When the two Korean teams marched together at the 2000 Sydney, 2004 
Athens and 2006 Turin Olympic opening ceremonies they were again united 
behind the unification flag. Initially Juan Antonio Samaranch, the then 
Olympic president, had proposed that all Korean athletes march jointly 
under the Olympic flag, which would be followed by the flags of each 
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country. South Korea accepted this proposal whilst North Korea argued that 
there was no need for the Olympic and the two national flags since both 
countries' ultimate goal is reunification. The name ‘Korea’ was used to 
represent the two countries during the opening ceremony, and the 
presidents of both nations’ Olympic committees followed the two flag bearers 
(one from each country) in front of the athletes and coaches.  
 
One of the biggest surprises, however, for the Olympic community happened in November 2005 
when sport administrators from both countries agreed in principle to form a unified team for the 
Beijing Olympics 2008 in China. The deal, struck on the sidelines of the East Asia Games in 
Macau and supported by the International Olympic Committee, followed years of inter-Korean 
talks. "The significance of this is we will be going onto the world stage as a unified team, and 
this will serve as a symbol of reconciliation and cooperation," a South Korean Unification 
Ministry official told me in an interview in May 2006. There was no doubt that the Chinese 
would like to see a unified Korean team to participate in the Beijing Olympics in 2008, as they 
welcomed the announcement enthusiastically. It would not only distract from the continuous 
discussions about China’s poor human rights record but also provide the Beijing Olympics with a 
lasting political legacy. Even the usually reserved Jacques Rogge, president of the IOC, appeared 
to be delighted whilst acknowledging that there are still some obstacles to overcome. In a press 
conference in Seoul on 4 April 2006, he stated that “Joining the march at the Olympics is 
definitely a symbolic issue, but it is still different from building up a unified team of the two 
Koreas”. A few days after the press conference I interviewed two fairly senior South Korean 
sport administrators of the National Olympic Committee who were supportive but skeptical as 
there were “too many stumbling blocks” (12/04/206). They could foresee several problems: 
Firstly, the principles underlying the actual selection of athletes; second, harmonizing training 
methods; third, agreeing lines of communication and responsibilities; and finally, finances.  
There was, however, little doubt that the two Koreas would continue using the blue 
and white unification flag. Furthermore, there seemed to be some kind of 
consensus among South Korean sport administrators (even before the 
negotiations started) that the anthem of the team would be ‘Arirang’, a 
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traditional love song popular in both Koreas, and that Seoul will have to assume the 
vast bulk of the costs. 
 
In comparison, in the early 1960s, the IOC, at that time headed by Avery 
Brundage, insisted that for the 1964 Olympic Summer Games in Tokyo, 
Japan, the first Olympics in Asia, a joint German team, officially called 
“United Team of Germany”, should be formed. “The incredible difficulties 
which occurred thereafter in forming a joint German team … led to a total of 
15 National Olympic Committee conferences and 96 meetings of the sport 
associations of East and West Germany. Over a thousand hours of 
discussions took place.” [20] Although it was the last time (before 
reunification) that a joint German team would compete in the Olympics, the 
IOC stipulated that both teams had to continue using a banner comprising 
the colours black, red and gold with the five Olympic rings in white set in the 
centre. 
 
Eventually Korea did not compete as one team at the Beijing Olympics due 
to insurmountable differences on the principles underlying the selection of 
athletes. The North demanded equal representation, whilst the South 
insisted that athletes should be chosen on the basis of their performance, 
prior achievements and world standing. Nevertheless, for many political 
commentators the declaration of intention itself represented a major 
breakthrough, another sign that North Korea was edging out of its isolation, 
and a new milestone for inter-Korean efforts to go one step further in their 
cooperation. North Korea’s willingness to constructively engage with the 
South in discussing sport matters (and gradually to abandon its isolationist 
politics) was further stressed by the participation of a high-profile North 
Korean delegation in the 15th General Assembly of the Association of the 
National Olympic Committees (ANOC). The ANOC was held in Seoul from 31 
March to 7 April 2006 under the auspices of the South Korean Olympic 
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Committee. The South and the North took advantage of this meeting as a 
venue and also held private talks about various inter-Korean cooperation 
issues but did not reveal any details. 
For the near future, there are preliminary plans to host the Gumball Rally, a glitzy race of ultra 
luxury cars driven by multi-millionaires, spanning the entire Korean peninsula. Although it is 
unlikely that any Koreans will participate in the race, it is the crossing of the DMZ, i.e. a 
temporary opening of the border between the two countries, which is of significant symbolical 
value.  
 
Intra-Korean sport events, exchanges and programmes 
 
Inter-Korean sport events, usually referred to as ‘unification … matches’ (with the name of the 
sport to be added), also started in the last decade of the last century. In October 1990, 
‘Unification Football Matches’ took place, the first events of this kind to be held in both capitals, 
Seoul and Pyongyang. The friendly, small-scale tournament, which became possible through 
talks between the sport ministers of the two Koreas during the Asian Games in Beijing earlier in 
the year, paved the way for further sporting co-operations in the divided nation and led to a 
variety of inter-Korean sport events that have become more frequent in the new millennium.  The 
‘Inter Korean Unification Soccer Match’ on 7 September 2002 took place in the World Cup 
Stadium in Seoul and was even sold out. ( Footnote V) Within a few years, the blue and 
white unification flag became so popular that the vast majority of young 
soccer fans wore them as T-shirts during a match between the two Koreas in 
August 2005. Even the well known Red Devils fan group swapped their 
traditional outfit for this powerful symbol and through the chanting of “Jokuk 
Tongil” called for the reunification of Korea. 
 
Since soccer is a popular sport in both countries, the South even sponsored 
the North and, in 2005, provided their neighbours with a complete set of shoes, shirts, 
bags, etc. worth 100 million Won ($ 97,000). After the North Korean soccer team’s sponsorship 
contract with Fila, an Italian sportswear manufacturing company, expired in 2002 the Football 
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Association struggled to find a new sponsor. Eventually, in January 2005, the Korea Soccer 
Research Institute decided to step in. 
 
Other sports have followed soccer’s example and have organised similar events. In 2000, the first 
‘Unification Basketball Tournament’ was held in the capitals of the two Koreas. Following the 
first couple of games, where the men's and women's All-Star teams played their Northern 
counterparts in Pyongyang in September, two more games took place in Seoul in December. The 
Pyongyang games were the first sport events in North Korea to be televised in South Korea.  
 
How determined the organisers of these unification events are to convey the 
right message shows the following example:  In February 2006, when the 
national women’s ice hockey sides of both countries met for a friendly match 
in Seoul, one of the South’s best players, Hwang Bo Young, was kept off the 
ice. She had to watch the game from the stands as she had fled from North 
Korea in 1997 aged 19. In the spirit of peace and friendship even the rules 
of this match had been changed and checking on the ice was not allowed. 
[21] Only one month later the Kangwon province invited a North Korean ice 
hockey team to play a friendly match in the South. This did not lead to a 
competition between North and South, as two mixed teams were formed 
each comprising athletes from both countries. Even the teams’ names URI 
(meaning ‘we’) and HANA (meaning ‘one’) reflected the reconciliatory spirit 
of this event. Equally important in practical and symbolic terms was the way 
the North Korean team travelled to the South. The team used the Tonghae 
Highway making it the first time North Koreans officially visited the South 
via a land route since the Korean peninsula was divided in 1945. 
 
Although the majority of unification sport events are initiated by and take 
place in the South there are also a few occurring in the North. On 24 
November 2005 a group of 150 marathon runners flew directly to Pyongyang 
to participate in the ‘Pyongyang-Nampho Marathon for Reunification’. North 
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Korean speakers at the opening ceremony suggested that the marathon 
provided an occasion to demonstrate “the Korean nation’s firm resolution to 
work hard for the reunification of the country under the banner of the June 
15 joint declaration, a landmark for independent reunification. Men and 
women runners from the north and the south … determined to reunify the 
country at any cost by the concerted efforts of the Koreans.” [22] 
 
The reunification theme also featured prominently in the unsuccessful bid of Pyeongchang, a 
small town in the above mentioned  Kangwon Province in the North-East of South Korea, to host 
the 2014 Winter Games. This was Pyeongchang’s second attempt, after it was defeated in 2003 
with Vancouver winning the rights to host the 2010 Winter Olympics. As before, Pyeongchang’s 
campaign drew on a mixture of economic, sport and political arguments to convince the IOC. In 
addition to tourism development and boosting the popularity of winter sports in the Asian world, 
Korean reunification was the most dominant theme of the official application form. 
 
The second paragraph of the introduction to this document introduces the 
issue in very theatrical and dramatic terms: “A people divided into South and 
North, the citizens of Korea stand united in respect for 5,000 years of 
tradition. There is a single Korean heart beating in tune with the rhythms of 
nature. A single spirit that soars across the peaks and valleys of this 
beautiful land.” The following pages go into greater depth and reveal more 
details of the ‘Hopes for Reconciliation with North Korea’. 
 
This is not only marketing rhetoric but also the leitmotiv for a number of 
high profile as well as grass-roots sport initiatives in this part of South 
Korea. The Kangwon province, that shares a border with North Korea, has 
run a series of inter-Korean sport exchange programmes over the last few 
years. In 2007, the province invited children from North Korea to participate 
in the ‘Dream Programme’, which provides young people from countries with 
a climate unsuitable for winter sports with first-hand experience of such 
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sports. A year before, in February 2006, 110 youths from 30 countries 
across Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe had participated in this 
programme.  Obviously, these activities were intended to have a positive 
impact on the decision-making process of the IOC but they also kept the 
idea of reunification in the media headlines. In a newspaper interview Kim 
Jin Sun, the governor of the Kangwon province confirmed this twofold 
rationale: 
 
“We have been trying to hold various inter-Korean sports exchanges to help 
ease the tension between the South and North. I think holding joint sports 
events is the best way to improve the relations and bring peace to the 
Korean Peninsula. … Prospering sports exchanges and cooperation will give 
Pyeongchang an advantage over other contenders because hosting a Winter 
Olympics here will help promote world peace and solidarity through sports, 
which is the true Olympic spirit.” [23]  
 
In November 2006 North Korea conducted another nuclear test, which raised tensions on the 
Korean peninsula. The only dialogue which continued focused upon sporting issues. Although 
political communication was reduced to a minimum, the governor of the Kangwon province and 
executive president of the Pyeongchang bidding committee, Kim Jin Sun, even visited North 
Korea for four days to discuss an expansion and the principles of future cooperation in the world 
of sport.  
 
The South Korean mass media have also reacted to these developments and started to pay more 
attention to sport events in which North Korean athletes and teams are involved. Their 
achievements at the Athens and Beijing Olympics were noted and celebrated, and North Korea’s 
qualifying matches for the 2006 Soccer World Cup in Germany were even broadcasted live. 
Newspapers have also started to treat outstanding North Korean sportsmen and women as if they 
were their own. The gold medal of Pak Hyon Suk at the Beijing Olympics, a female North 
Korean weightlifter, was widely celebrated in the South Korean print media whilst the use of 
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beta blockers and subsequent expulsion of Kim Jong Su, who won two medals in the shooting 
competitions, were treated as low-key incidents emphasizing that “The North still stayed within 
the top 20 in the overall medal standings” [24]  The coverage of both TV and print media is 
extremely friendly, favourable, enthusiastic and positive, often stressing the deep bonds and 
ethnic ties between the two Koreas. Several male and female, middle-aged, well-educated 
interviewees were very surprised about this dramatic development  and stressed the stark contrast 
between the representations of North Koreans they remembered from their school books (“bad”, 
“malicious”, “dangerous”, “evil”, “devils”, “demons”, “warmongers”) and the overwhelmingly 
positive and inclusive contemporary characterizations.  
 
The Arirang festival: North Korea’s propaganda and new foreign 
policy toy  
 
Physical culture has recently started to play a more important role in North 
Korea’s domestic and foreign propaganda agenda in order to demonstrate 
the uniqueness, strength and stability of its political system, to display Kim 
Jong Il’s popularity and his ability to control the country firmly. Most notably 
in this context is the Arirang festival, an impressive spectacle of gymnastic 
and artistic extravaganza that premiered on 29 April 2002 to mark the 90th 
anniversary of the birth of the ‘Eternal President’ Kim Il Sung (1912-1994). 
The Arirang festival also celebrated the 60th birthday of Kim Jong Il, the 
‘Dear Leader’, who inherited power from his father in 1994, and the 70th 
anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army. “True to the 
North's way of doing nothing by half, it dwarfs anything seen even during 
the heyday of the far more prosperous communist regimes of the former 
eastern bloc.” [25] 
 
In 2002, this festival was scheduled to distract attention from the parallel 
World Cup in the South and - most importantly - prove it is not the evil place 
depicted by President George W. Bush. Its sequel took place in October 2005 
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to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the North Korean Communist Party. As 
before, the stage was the 150,000-capacity May Day stadium in Pyongyang 
and the 90-minute show made full use of the impoverished nation's last 
natural resource: cheap, utterly obedient and highly educated labour. In 
2008, the Arirang festival celebrated the 60th anniversary of the foundation 
of the North Korean state. Furthermore, a new show (‘Prosper our 
Motherland’) had been put together drawing on the same ingredients and 
telling the story of the DPRK. 
 
The performance with its endlessly rehearsed and flawless choreography 
comprised two distinctive elements: a floorshow by several thousand 
gymnasts, acrobats, dancers and other performers including: a military 
tattoo, a martial arts display, hordes of waving, smiling children, an aerial 
ballet by dancers on bungee ropes, displays of rhythmic gymnastics, flying 
acrobatics, traditional dancing and military taekwondo routines. The most 
breathtaking element of Arirang was the backdrop - a giant human mosaic 
that formed elaborate panoramas of historical scenes, individuals, slogans, 
objects and cartoons. More than 30,000 children held up coloured cards and 
changed them so quickly that these pictures appeared to be animated - all 
totally synchronized to a massive video and laser light show. Obviously, such 
a spectacle is major propaganda offensive and a public demonstration of 
North Korea’s pride and self-confidence. There are three remarkable issues 
which need to be addressed in more detail: First, as well as underpinning the 
religious cult of Kim Jong-Il and his father, the 2005 festival marked the 
beginning of an international charm offensive. Not since the euphoric summit 
between the North's leader and South Korea's president Kim Dae Jung in 
June 2000 (Footnote VI) had there been such a show of openness in 
Pyongyang. During the festivities foreigners were allowed to enter the 
country that only has 300 recorded foreign residents. Even Americans widely 
referred to as ‘mije chimnyakja’ (‘American imperialist aggressors’) were 
 22 
able to obtain visas and enter North Korea in 2005. “Among them have been 
New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson and former CBS News anchorman Dan 
Rather. The festival brought official delegations from China, Russia and Cuba 
as well as high ranking visitors from Mexico and a host of other nations.” 
[26] Along with a growing number of curious Western spectators, in 2005 
ordinary South Korean citizens were for the first time ever allowed to fly 
directly from Seoul (Incheon) to Pyongyang (Footnote VII) and attend the 
Arirang spectacle. Approximately 1,000 South Koreans made the Arirang 
pilgrimage on overnight package tours. Kim Jong Il’s ‘invitation diplomacy’, a 
political tool his father used to exploit to great effect, is intended to show 
how strong and stable North Korea is, how firmly he is in control and how 
popular he remains with the people. This message would not get out loud 
and clear, unless there were select groups of foreigners there to witness it. 
Three years later, however, South Koreans were not welcome (and 
Americans only allowed to stay for a very short period of time) which clearly 
reflected the political climate. 
Second, in 2005 one short segment of the performance disappeared after 
South Korean media complained about the offensive contents. In the show 
three North Korean martial arts specialists kicked, punched and subdued 30 
unnamed enemies. But there was a clue: the ‘enemies’ wore uniforms 
identical to those which were used by the South Korean armed forces before 
1990. “Unification Ministry and intelligence sources said the North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-il watched the show Sunday and that his "on-the-scene 
inspection" may have triggered the cut.” [27] This last minute alteration 
must be interpreted as another small gesture among many of the 
reconciliatory spirit and confidence in evidence in North Korea. 
Third, the issue of reunification played a major role in the 2005 and 2008 spectacles. Both the 
fourth act (‘Arirang Reunification’) and the ‘Grande Finale’ focused on the reunification issue. 
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Participants held up coloured cards creating a montage of South and North Korean children, 
while chanting "How much longer do we have to be split due to foreign forces?" [28] A different 
segment features the ‘reunification train’ - a reference to a new railway link across the DMZ. 
The same train as well as several other related themes, e.g. the joint declarations on Korean 
unifications, featured prominently in the third act of the new “Prosper our Motherland” show. 
The unification scenes also contained several references to Mount Baekdu, an important place in 
both South and North Korean mythology. The mountain is located in the North along the border 
with China and it is not uncommon for South Korean tourists to travel to the Chinese side for a 
visit of this mountain of mythical resonances.   
Conclusion: Commonalities and differences 
The ultimate purpose of any comparative analysis is to identify, explain and 
evaluate commonalities and differences providing that the two societies in 
question are in fact comparable. The large number of socio-historical and 
political similarities in the twentieth century leaves little doubt that 
comparing Korea and Germany is a legitimate and useful exercise. However, 
the following contextual differences need to be acknowledged: 
First, the two countries are located in very different parts of the world and 
influenced by distinctively different philosophical and cultural traditions. 
Second, Korea’s industrialisation and modernisation occurred much later 
than Germany’s, i.e. in the second half of the twentieth century, and was 
carried out with unprecedented speed. Third, in the aftermath of World War 
II, Germany did not suffer from a gruesome civil war which killed millions of 
soldiers and civilians, and which will make the unification of the Korean 
peninsula even more difficult. “It is very hard to believe that the People’s 
Army commanders who fought the South in such a bloody fracticidal war 
would allow the ROK to overwhelm the DPRK, by whatever means.” [29] 
Fourth, whilst the Russian troops left North Korea in 1948, East Germany 
hosted 360,000 Soviet military personnel until 1990. However, the Soviet 
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leader Mikhail Gorbachev decided not to mobilise these troops when the East 
German regime under Erich Honecker started to collapse in the autumn of 
1989. Despite these contextual differences both countries can easily be 
juxtaposed for the purpose of a comparative analysis. The degree of 
similarities goes far beyond the above mentioned issues as the following 
detail will demonstrate: Whilst the only active resistance from within Europe 
towards Germany’s reunification came from Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative government in Britain, one of Korea’s closest geographical 
neighbours also does not appear to be in favour of the unification of the 
Korean peninsula. For Japan, a unified Korean peninsula would not only form 
an influential political force (and rival) in East Asia but also a powerful 
economic competitor in the global market. “No doubt the combined 
economies of North and South, married to such a talented and well-educated 
people, would quickly rival Japan. That is one reason why Japanese leaders 
(…) have taken a dim view of Korean reunification, and in the past actively 
thwarted it by lining up almost exclusively with Seoul.” [30] In both cases 
old and antiquated rivalries seem to outweigh contemporary political 
realism.  
With particular reference to the politics of sport in divided Korea and 
Germany (Footnote VIII) there are two broad areas that warrant detail 
attention as both are frequently underpinned, framed and shaped by the 
reunification theme: First, the bidding for and hosting of mega sport events 
and mass spectacles, and, second, the use of international competitions to 
celebrate (and occasionally live) national unity. 
There is little doubt that both South Korea and West Germany have been 
keen on hosting major sport events. Whilst the 1988 Summer Olympics in 
Seoul succeeded in displaying South Korea’s technological and industrial 
advancement, and economic achievements to a world audience, the 2002 
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Soccer World Cup was intended to be a “catalyst to create popular harmony, 
system stability and to promote a neo-liberal hegemony in Korea”. [31] On 
both occasions the central government was largely successful. In contrast, 
the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich failed to achieve its political 
objectives, namely the representation of the new, democratic and liberal 
Germany, as they were overshadowed by the terrorist attack on the Olympic 
village and the subsequent dismal failure of the German authorities and law-
enforcement agencies to free the Israeli hostages. In addition, “since the 
GDR had been granted full rights by the I.O.C., the decision forced 
recognition of the East German flag, emblem, and anthem on West German 
soil.” [32]   Two years later, however, the Soccer World Cup managed to 
partly rehabilitate the German hosts due to their efficient and smooth 
organisation, the high quality football and the victory of the German team 
(Footnote IX).  The latter contributed significantly to the consolidation of a 
distinctive national identity and to an improvement of Germany’s global 
reputation. [33] Most recently Germany has successfully hosted the 2006 
World Cup and impressed both travelling football fans as well as a global 
television audience with a colourful and entertaining sporting festival which 
will certainly be remembered for its unprecedented friendly, peaceful, 
positive and joyful atmosphere. For the Germans themselves this event 
marked a dramatic change in their attitude towards traditional symbols of 
nationalism, such as the national flag and anthem. For the first time since 
1945 they were able to publicly and unreservedly embrace them without any 
threatening undertones.  
However, West Germany’s desire and justification to host major international 
sport events hardly ever included references to the relationship with the 
German Democratic Republic. Only Berlin’s unsuccessful bid to host the 2000 
Summer Olympics contained a low-key political rationale. The bidding 
committee argued that staging the Games in Berlin would have tremendous 
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political symbolism signifying the end of the Cold War and the city’s potential 
to bridge the gap between East and West. Furthermore, the Olympics would 
provide the city and the country with a global stage to celebrate a unified 
and rebuilt Germany that is prepared to play a leading role in the post Cold 
War Europe of the new millennium.  
During the period of separation both German countries were more concerned 
with exploiting  sport’s potential to establish distinctive national identities 
and to exploit the playing fields as an arena for symbolic ideological battles, 
even if it stressed differences and indirectly consolidated the existing 
political division. According to Markus Wolf, the former head of the East 
German secret service, international sport events were also used for 
conspiratory meetings with their spies, e.g. “The Winter Olympics in 
Innsbruck, Austria, in 1976 provided good cover for a meeting.” [34] In 
contrast, South Korea’s political agenda attached to such events is largely 
dominated by reunification issues. This is most obvious in the documentation 
supplied to the International Olympic Committee in support of 
Pyeongchang’s application to host the 2014 Winter Olympics.  
The uniqueness of the Arirang festival provides the North Korean rulers with 
a rare and unrivalled opportunity to present the country to the rest of the 
world. Its perfect choreography, the active involvement of tens of thousands 
of citizens and its non-competitive spirit offers an alternative to the concept, 
norms and values of modern sport and celebrates an interpretation of 
physical culture which falls outside the dominant ‘higher, faster, stronger’ 
philosophy. This spectacle provides foreigners with the rare opportunity to 
visit this isolated country and the North Korean government with an 
inexpensive symbolic gesture demonstrating more openness and 
transparency. As the Arirang festival is currently one of the very few 
windows of opportunity for foreign journalists and camera teams to enter the 
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DPRK, the archived visual footage from this spectacle is frequently used as a 
background to TV reports of natural disasters, catastrophic accidents or 
important political events. In contrast, East Germany relied almost 
completely on its track suit ambassadors’ activities abroad. 
The Arirang festival is also a contemporary reminder of the powerful Soviet 
influences on the development of sport and physical culture in both East 
Germany as well as North Korea. The spectacle draws heavily on two equally 
rehearsed and scripted events which emerged under Stalin: the theatrically 
orchestrated Physical Culture Days, with their choreographed and elaborate 
parades through Moscow’s Red Square as well as  “mass gymnastic displays, 
bizarre and idiosyncratic floats, and omnipresent portraits of Stalin”, [35] 
and the Spartakiades which were “to be distinguished from the Olympics by 
the inclusion of military events, folk dances and noncompetitive pageants”, 
although “the core of the progam … was the same as that of the Olympics”. 
[36] After the Russian Revolution the Bolshevik leaders decided not to take 
part in the modern Olympics since they rejected the aristocratic background 
of the movement’s leaders and the amateurism dogma which, they argued, 
inhibited working class participation. Consequently, the emergence of the 
Spartakiad was an ideologically grounded attempt to offer an alternative to 
the ‘bourgeois’ multi-sport events of the Olympic movement. 
With reference to the use of sport as a foreign policy tool there are hardly 
any commonalities. Both the divided Germany and Korea share(d) a belief in 
the positive virtues of an explicit and special foreign policy towards their 
neigbours that is based on encouraging change through rapprochement and 
engagement rather than isolation. However, in Germany sport was not 
included in this approach. Seven years after the end of World War II 
Germany was readmitted to the Olympic community. From 1956 to 1964 
East and West Germany competed in the Olympic Games as one team using 
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a non-partisan flag and Beethoven’s ‘Ode of Joy’ as their anthem. 
Subsequently, the IOC agreed to the separate representation of the two 
German states which lasted for the next 24 years. During this period of time 
West and East Germany remained tough rivals right up to reunification in 
1990. Even in the early 1970s when a number of small steps were taken to 
normalise the relationship between the two German states, sport exchanges 
were not part of this agenda. Sporting encounters between the two German 
countries remained fiercely competitive until the collapse of the GDR. 
Ironically, the last time the two Germanys competed as separate countries 
at an Olympics was in Seoul in 1988. East Germany's outstanding sporting 
successes have been tainted by the subsequent knowledge that some of its 
athletes used performance-enhancing drugs. In sharp contrast, both Korean 
states have always competed separately at the Olympics. In Korea, 
however, cooperation in the world of sport is multi-dimensional and appears 
to be an important diplomatic tool although it lacks a systematic, structured 
and thought-through policy framework. Particularly since the beginning of 
the new millennium there have been a number of dramatic changes as a 
joint Korean team participated in the opening and closing ceremonies of 
various Summer and Winter Olympics. There appears to be a growing sense 
that due to the very difficult reunification situation both countries’ 
governments see international sport as one of the few high profile and 
inexpensive ways of celebrating their common cultural heritage and  keeping 
the political goal of unifying the divided peninsula in the public discourse. 
Furthermore, there appears to be little rivalry on the playing fields between 
North and South Korea. Quite the opposite, the organisers of non-
competitive, friendly ‘unification’ matches continuously aim to stress 
harmony and unity, and celebrate historical and cultural commonalities. In 
fact, the dominant rivalry of both Koreas appears to be with Japan due to 
the country’s colonial history and its attempt to completely annexe the 
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Korean peninsula in the first half of the twentieth century. In sharp contrast, 
West and East German sporting encounters have always been tense and 
highly competitive. In a large number of popular German sport history books 
the 1-0 defeat to the East German team at the 1974 Soccer World Cup is 
described as one of the most embarrassing moments in West Germany’s 
history. The regular superiority of the East German team at both the 
Summer and Winter Olympics has always been a thorn in the side of West-
German politicians. 
Due to its extremely limited resources and expertise it is very unlikely that in 
the near future the DPRK will be able to produce an Asian ‘sports miracle’ 
and impress the rest of the world with outstanding achievements and 
victories (as they did at the 1966 Soccer World Cup in England when they 
did not only cause the organizers some severe diplomatic headaches but 
also beat  Italy to reach the quarter finals). [37] In contrast to the GDR, 
however, the North Korean government does not prevent the very small 
number of outstanding athletes the country has produced to seek 
employment abroad. In East Germany, the state’s paranoia about athletes 
attempting to defect whilst on international duties went to such an extent, 
that a large number of ‘minders’, usually members of the secret service, 
always traveled with them to international competitions. In addition, a 
considerable amount of part-time spies (comprising fellow athletes, sport 
scientists, coaches, support staff, etc.) kept a detailed record of all athletes’ 
behaviour, political opinions and, most importantly, commitment to the 
socialist state. [38] The story of the basketball player Ri Myong Hun clearly 
shows the different attitude of the DPRK’s government as well as the 
obstacles North Korean top-level athletes face abroad.  
At 2.40 meters (7 ft 9 in), Ri Myong Hun is a giant among basketball 
players. He hoped to show NBA fans his passion for basketball as well as his 
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skills, particularly the unique ability to dunk the ball with both feet on the 
ground. Naturally, it was his height that first caught the attention of several 
NBA teams but also his perfect shooting from the 3-point line. He was 
allowed to move to Canada in 1998 where his coach, Jack Donahue, put him 
on a strict regimen of weights, full court basketball, conditioning and even 
daily English lessons to get him ready for the NBA. After a short period of 
time several teams were interested in signing him. However, this never 
happened, as the US State and Treasury Departments’ Foreign Assets 
Control regulations, also known as the ‘Trading with the Enemy Act’, bans 
American companies from doing business with North Korea and its citizens. 
The North Korean government had demanded that a proportion of Ri's salary 
should be given to the North Korean state. Ri returned home in 2000 where 
he continued to play for the national team and is considered a national hero. 
For North Korea this was obviously a missed (public relations) opportunity to 
initiate the development of an alternative discourse as outstanding foreign 
individual athletes have the power to shift the public’s view. Their high-
profile performances can replace dominant images, beliefs and perceptions 
that – in the case of North Korea as well as for example Cuba – tend to vilify 
other country’s leaders and to demonize and stereotype other nations. 
 
In a nutshell, after successfully hosting the Seoul Olympics in 1988 and the Soccer World Cup 
2002 the South Korean government’s foreign policy focus has now shifted. It tries to utilize sport 
not only for international recognition, national pride and prestige purposes but also as a tool to 
promote, grow and intensify dialogue with the North. Instead of focussing on differences and 
rivalries the emphasis is on celebrating commonalities and cooperation.  
East Germany’s political collapse and the subsequent reunification came as a 
total surprise to everybody, politicians, the people, and the global 
community. Although it had been on people’s minds and part of the general 
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political agenda and discourse, nobody expected it to happen so suddenly. 
Therefore the West German state was totally unprepared and the whole 
population still suffers from the catastrophic consequences of the rushed 
political and economic reunification. The dramatic exodus of many top-level 
East German athletes, in fact, contributed significantly to the collapse of the 
Socialist regime after the wall came down. The discontinuation of national 
sporting competitions was the most visible sign to everybody that East 
Germany’s civil society was crumbling. In Korea, sport, in general, and inter-
Korean sport exchanges, in particular, form an essential part of a 
reunification policy of small steps. There is a sense that Korean politicians 
not only want to learn from, and eventually avoid, the mistakes made in 
Germany but also that they have chosen sport to make a more positive and 
constructive contribution to the unification of the Korean peninsula which 
goes far beyond what Levermore and Budd have called the promotion of 
“détente between the two Koreas”. [39] 
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Footnotes 
(I) Whenever the term ‘Korea’ is used, it refers to the Korean nation and peninsula as a whole 
deliberately ignoring the political division as this is a fairly recent phenomenon (commencing in 
1948) considering the very long recorded history of this nation dating back approximately 5 
millenniums.   
(II) The Korea Foundation is an independent cultural and educational organization, affiliated to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and supported by public funding and private donations. The 
Foundation was established in 1991 with the aim of enhancing Korea’s image and reputation in the 
world through the promotion of various academic and cultural exchange programmes. Amongst 
many other activities, it provides a wide range of fellowship grants for students and scholars with 
an interest in Korea to visit the country, to undertake research and to disseminate the results. For 
more details see: www.kf.or.kr 
(III) The US has quietly maintained a long-term troop presence in South Korea, currently 
numbered at about 30.000, since intervening in the 1950-53 Korean War. 
(IV) During the 1997 Asian financial crisis the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pledged 
South Korea US$60 billion to help it weather the storm but attached harsh terms to this agreement 
forcing the government to introduce a programme of political reforms. 
(V) In order to avoid any diplomatic embarrassment national flags were strictly prohibited. 
(VI) Kim Dae Jung’s innovative inter-Korean policy approach is often referred to as 
‘Nordpolitik’. Due to the large number of commonalities between the divided Germany and Korea, 
political scientists tend to use very similar terms which originated in the German context and 
language to describe and analyse the situation on the Korean peninsula. The term Ostpolitik, for 
example, refers to the specific set of political initiatives, policies and activities the West-German 
government developed and employed to deal with its neighbour in the East (German: Ost). As 
Korea is not divided in an Eastern and Western part but in North and South, the term Nordpolitik is 
the result of a linguistic adaptation process recognising the different geographical locations (Nord 
meaning North). 
(VII) This in itself, i.e. being able to fly directly from Seoul to Pyongyang was a novelty and of 
extreme political significance as there are no direct flights between the two capitals. 
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(VIII) Due to the limited scope of this paper other interesting comparisons have to be ignored, e.g. 
a juxtaposition of the Olympic achievements of all four countries which raises a number of 
questions about the different approaches to the production of top-level achievements in the world 
of sport. 
(IX) As both the 1936 Nazi Olympics and the 1972 Munich Games had left German politicians 
with disastrous legacies, the organizers of the 1974 World Cup were deeply concerned about the 
safety of players and spectators and provided an army of security personnel from the armed forces 
and the police to protect the teams and fans, so that some observers labeled the event 'the World 
Cup of the Uniforms'.    
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